G.R. No. 119002, 19 October 2000

FACTS:

On June 30 1989, petitioner International Express Travel and Tour Services, Inc., through its managing director, wrote a letter to the Philippine Football Federation (Federation), through its president private respondent Henri Kahn, wherein the former offered its services as a travel agency to the latter. The offer was accepted.

Petitioner secured the airline tickets for the trips of the athletes and officials of the Federation to the South East Asian Games in Kuala Lumpur as well as various other trips to the People’s Republic of China and Brisbane. The total cost of the tickets amounted to P449,654.83. For the tickets received, the Federation made two partial payments, both in September of 1989, in the total amount of P176,467.50.

The tickets were not paid.

This prompted petitioner to file a civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner sued Henri Kahn in his personal capacity and as President of the Federation and impleaded the Federation as an alternative defendant. Petitioner sought to hold Henri Kahn liable for the unpaid balance for the tickets purchased by the Federation on the ground that Henri Kahn allegedly guaranteed the said obligation.

Henri Kahn filed his answer with counterclaim. While not denying the allegation that the Federation owed the amount P207,524.20, representing the unpaid balance for the plane tickets, he averred that the petitioner has no cause of action against him either in his personal capacity or in his official capacity as president of the Federation. He maintained that he did not guarantee payment but merely acted as an agent of the Federation which has a separate and distinct juridical personality.

On the other hand, the Federation failed to file its answer, hence, was declared in default by the trial court. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment and ruled in favor of the petitioner and declared Henri Kahn personally liable for the unpaid obligation of the Federation.

The Appellate Court held that the petitioner had dealt with the Federation as a corporate entity and in not holding that the private respondent Khan was the one, who represented the federation as having a corporate entity.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner had dealt with the federation as a corporate entity.

RULING:

No. The resolution of the case at bar hinges on the determination of the existence of the Philippine Football Federation as a juridical person. In the assailed decision, the appellate court recognized the existence of the Federation. In support of this, the CA cited Republic Act 3135, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation, and Presidential Decree No. 604 as the laws from which said Federation derives its existence.

As correctly observed by the appellate court, both R.A. 3135 and P.D. No. 604 recognized the juridical existence of national sports associations. This may be gleaned from the powers and functions granted to these associations.

The above powers and functions granted to national sports associations clearly indicate that these entities may acquire a juridical personality. The power to purchase, sell, lease and encumber property are acts which may only be done by persons, whether natural or artificial, with juridical capacity. However, while we agree with the appellate court that national sports associations may be accorded corporate status, such does not automatically take place by the mere passage of these laws

It is a basic postulate that before a corporation may acquire juridical personality, the State must give its consent either in the form of a special law or a general enabling act. We cannot agree with the view of the appellate court; and the private respondent that the Philippine Football Federation came into existence upon the passage of these laws. Nowhere can it be found in R.A. 3135 or P.D. 604 any provision creating the Philippine Football Federation. These laws merely recognized the existence of national sports associations and provided the manner by which these entities may acquire juridical personality.

Thus being said, it follows that private respondent Henry Kahn should be held liable for the unpaid obligations of the unincorporated Philippine Football Federation. It is a settled principal in corporation law that any person acting or purporting to act on behalf of a corporation which has no valid existence assumes such privileges and becomes personally liable for contract entered into or for other acts performed as such agent. As president of the Federation, Henri Kahn is presumed to have known about the corporate existence or non-existence of the Federation.

We cannot subscribe to the position taken by the appellate court that even assuming that the Federation was defectively incorporated, the petitioner cannot deny the corporate existence of the Federation because it had contracted and dealt with the Federation in such a manner as to recognize and in effect admit its existence. The doctrine of corporation by estoppel is mistakenly applied by the respondent court to the petitioner. The application of the doctrine applies to a third party only when he tries to escape liabilities on a contract from which he has benefited on the irrelevant ground of defective incorporation. In the case at bar, the petitioner is not trying to escape liability from the contract but rather is the one claiming from the contract.

*Case digest by Paul Jason G. Acasio, JD-IV, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY 2019-2020