G.R. No. L-39419, 12 April 1982, 113 SCRA 459
Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on November 21, 1970. A Policy was issued by Perla thru its author representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve (12) months with beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during lifetime of policy, information was filed against the wife of Rodrigo because allegedly she unlawfully acted as an agent in the solicitation of the insurance without having been first secured a certificate of authority to act as an agent from the office of the Insurance Commission. The People of the Philippines presented evidence that aforementioned policy was issued with active participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo, against which appellant in her defense sought to show that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew …
RTC and CA find the accused guilty and fined petitioner 500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency for the violation of the Insurance Act. Solicitor General was made to comment on the case and the same said that the petitioner is not guilty because she does not fall under the definition of agent as provided under par. 2 of the sec. 189 of the Insurance Act.
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section?
No. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word “agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence —
Any person who for compensation … shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, …
Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true with respect to the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section. The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term “agent” mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole.
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The appellate court has established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. It must be noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.
*Case digest by Em Epsan M. Batoon LLB IV, Andres Bonifacio Law School, S.Y 2018-2019