Petitioner Rosario Carbonnel allegedly purchased a parcel of land from respondent Jose Poncio. Such land was mortgage to a bank which respondent has an obligation to pay. It was alleged that petitioner partially pay the respondent of the price of the land and to assume respondent`s responsibility to recover the land. One of the conditions of the alleged sale was that Poncio would be allowed to continue in staying in said land for one year. However, Poncio has conveyed the same land the other respondents herein which are the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Infante. Respondents herein claims that the previous sale between Poncio and petitioner was unenforceable due to a violation of the Statute of Fraud as the alleged sale was never deduced to writing. Petitioner here claims ownership of the said property.
Whether or not the transaction falls under the Statute of Frauds.
No. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the Statute of Frauds is applicable only to executory contracts. It is the accepted view that part performance of a parol contract for the sale of real estate has the effect, subject to certain conditions concerning the nature and extent of the acts constituting performance and the right to equitable relief generally, of taking such contract from the operation of the statute of frauds, so that chancery may decree its specific performance or grant other equitable relief. If a contract has been totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith, for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already denied by him from the transaction in litigation, and, at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him thereby.
The true basis of the doctrine of part performance according to the overwhelming weight of authority, is that it would be a fraud upon the plaintiff if the defendant were permitted to escape performance of his part of the oral agreement after he has permitted the plaintiff to perform in reliance upon the agreement.
In the case at bar, it appears that Poncio still asked permission from petitioner to stay in the premises. Aside from that, it was shown that the passbook of Poncio was in the hand of the Petitioner and it has a credit account allegedly representing the amount partially paid by petitioner.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside, and let this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against defendants-appellees. It is so ordered.
* Case digest by Frilin Lomosad, LLB-1, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY 2017-2018